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The performance of the industrial point-source water pollution abatement program in the 
U.S. Clean Water Act is examined.  I begin with a brief description of the statute and then turn to 
a description of the process used to develop the rules that govern effluent discharges.  This is 
followed by a discussion of the outcomes resulting from efforts to apply these rules to industrial 
pollutant sources.  Two types of outcomes are considered:  administrative outcomes and 
outcomes in the water.  Last, the issue of implementation is discussed:  how the Clean Water Act 
may have affected the incentives governing the behavior of industrial dischargers, municipal 
waste treatment plant operators, and regulators. Surprisingly, there is some evidence that the 
Clean Water Act, at least as far as industrial point sources are concerned, may be evolving into 
an effluent fee policy, or at least a mixed policy. 
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Winston Harrington∗ 
The Clean Water Act 
The principal instrument governing efforts to improve and maintain water quality 
in the nation’s streams and lakes is the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. Chapter 26).  Water 
quality became a mainly federal responsibility in 1972, with the passage of the Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 92-500).  
Prior to 1972, water quality was primarily a state and local concern, and the 
federal government’s role was limited to providing grants to municipalities for 
wastewater treatment—the grants began in 1956—as well as information and planning 
assistance to the states.  At the time, the states’ approach to water quality was use-based; 
water bodies were classified according to the highest desired use, and water quality 
standards were set accordingly.  Implicitly, waste disposal and transport was accepted as 
one of the legitimate uses of the nation’s water resources.  By 1970, however, a strong 
consensus felt that this approach had not prevented the steady decline in water quality 
throughout the country.  Several well-publicized examples of poor water quality in the 
late 1960s, culminating in an incident on June 22, 1969, in which an oil slick on the 
Cuyahoga River near Cleveland caught fire, dramatized what appeared to be a growing 
problem.  (On the other hand, the first National Water Quality Inventory, conducted by 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1973, found that in general water quality 
had improved in the preceding decade, at least in terms of fecal bacteria and organic 
matter (CEQ 1976)). 
The new federal approach set as a national goal nothing less than the elimination 
of pollutant discharges into the nation’s waters by 1985.  This “zero-discharge” goal did 
not refer to effluent itself, but to the pollutants in effluent.  But it meant that, in the long 
run, waste disposal and assimilation was no longer to be an acceptable use of water 
resources.  Two interim goals were set:  the nation’s waters were to be “fishable and 
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swimmable” by 1983, and toxic pollutants in amounts harmful to human activities or 
aquatic ecosystems were to be eliminated.   
The Clean Water Act relied primarily on two tools to achieve these goals:  First, 
the Construction Grants Program would provide massive federal support to publicly 
owned treatment works (POTWs)—wastewater treatment plants owned and operated by 
municipalities and local sewer districts.  These grants would pay 75% of the construction 
cost of new wastewater treatment plants, or for expansion of existing plants.1  The 
Construction Grants Program was in operation from 1973 to 1988, and, over its lifetime, 
paid out grants of $60 billion.  It was replaced by a revolving loan fund. 
The second tool was a system of technology-based regulations governing the 
discharge of water pollution from point sources.  These point sources included both 
POTWs and two classes of industrial facilities:  direct dischargers, which discharge 
effluent directly into receiving waters; and indirect dischargers, which discharge effluent 
into a sewer, where it is carried to a POTW.  The industrial standards are the focus of this 
investigation, and we describe them in more detail in the next section.  
The Clean Water Act was amended in 1977 and again in 1987 to extend the 
deadlines for promulgation of and compliance with the standards.  In addition, in 1987 
the EPA was ordered to promulgate effluent guidelines for additional point source 
categories.  
The Clean Water Act was in the vanguard of a major change in the federal 
government’s regulation of economic activity.  Up until the late 1960s, federal regulation 
tended to be economic, concerned with such matters as regulating the prices of goods or 
services produced by industries thought to be natural monopolies and whose activities 
crossed state lines. These included railroads, airlines, and transmission of natural gas and 
electricity. Federal regulation also restricted activities of banks and sought to prevent 
excessive concentrations of market power.  The seventies began a period of “social 
regulation,” concerned with workplace safety and health, environmental quality, exposure 
to hazardous chemicals, unsafe consumer products, and like concerns.  Ironically, as 
social regulation waxed, economic regulation waned, with deregulation of airlines, 
trucking, railroads, banking, and, currently in progress, electricity. 
                                                 
1 In addition to these federal funds, several states contributed matching funds to the capital costs of 
municipal wastewater treatment plants.  Maryland, for example, contributed an additional 5 percent. 
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Developing Regulations for Industrial Point Sources  
For point sources, the backbone of the regulation is the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), which requires permits of all significant 
dischargers of wastewater into surface waters.  These permits state the effluent discharge 
limits the source must meet, usually in terms of kilograms of pollutant per day.  The 
dischargers affected include both industrial plants and POTWs, which are mostly owned 
by municipalities or special sanitary districts and are designed to treat domestic waste. 
The specific requirements in the permits are determined by a complex system of 
regulation that begins with federally established Effluent Guidelines.2  The guidelines 
establish a set of technology-based performance standards that all point sources must 
meet, except where water quality considerations demand even more stringent standards.3  
The guidelines are very detailed, breaking industrial plants into a very large number of 
categories, each with its own set of pollutant-specific regulations.  
The technology-based Effluent Guidelines could not guarantee achievement of 
adequate water quality in all receiving waters, so permit writers were required to set even 
more stringent “water-quality-limited” standards for plants discharging into such water 
bodies.  These standards necessarily depended on the current conditions of the receiving 
water body and its capacity to absorb waste.  Also, the effluent limitations for any firm 
affected and were affected by the effluent limitations on all other firms.  
The front-line administration of this program—i.e., the writing of the NPDES 
permits and the routine monitoring and enforcement of permit requirements—could be 
delegated, to appropriate state agencies upon demonstration of sufficient legal and 
institutional capacity for the job. At present, nearly all the states have delegated 
programs.  The state departments of environmental quality (DEQs)4 are supervised by the 
10 EPA regional offices. 
                                                 
2 42 CFR 403.  Statutory authority for the Effluent Guidelines is found in the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 
Chapter 26). 
3 Technology-based standards are effluent limits for dischargers that are based on the performance of a 
designated abatement technology, without consideration of the environmental or social problem caused by 
the discharges. 
4 This is a convenient generic term.  Actual state names for the agencies responsible for environmental 
quality are quite varied.  
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Discharge Requirements for POTWs 
Before turning to industrial point sources, we first describe the effluent discharge 
policy for POTWs, which also had to obtain NPDES permits.  POTWs have an important 
influence on the industrial point source program.  As noted above, many industrial 
plants—the indirect dischargers—discharge wastewater into sewers connected to 
POTWs.  This gives POTWs the dual role of regulator and service provider for indirect 
discharging plants.   
There are separate sets of guidelines for POTWs designed expressly for the 
treatment of household waste, which consists of about 100 gallons per person per day of 
organic waste rich in fecal bacteria and containing about 300 milligrams per liter (mg/l) 
each of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and total suspended solids (TSS), plus 
varying amounts of organic phosphorus and nitrogen.  In 1972, most municipal 
wastewater treatment plants had “primary treatment”—use of physical processes (e.g., 
skimming, screening, settling)—capable of about 65% removal of BOD and TSS. Some 
also had in addition “secondary treatment,” a biological process that raised removal 
efficiency to 80–90%, or a waste concentration of about 15–30 mg/l.  One of the goals 
and eventual achievements of the Clean Water Act was to implement secondary treatment 
throughout the United States and “tertiary” or advanced waste treatment processes where 
needed to meet water quality standards.   
The typical restrictions contained in an NPDES permit for a POTW are as 
follows:  
•  Specific limitations on both conventional and nonconventional pollutants in both 
wastewater and sludge,5   
•  Toxic pollutant limitations, 
•  Criteria on acceptable uses for sludge, 
•  Removal efficiency requirements (e.g., 85% removal of BOD), and 
•  Other operating requirements to ensure effective operation and maintenance. 
                                                 
5 Conventional pollutants include biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and total suspended solids (TSS).  
BOD is the amount of dissolved oxygen that will be consumed in the water by the pollutant.  EPA has 
identified 15 “pollutants of concern” that are often found in sludge and wastewater from POTWs.  These 
include the “conventional pollutants” BOD, TSS, and ammonia, plus 12 metals such as arsenic and 
mercury.  The POTW is also required to be on the lookout for other pollutants that may be local problems. 
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Direct Discharges from Industrial Plants 
In the 1972 Act, Congress directed the EPA to prepare guidelines for 30 
designated industries.6  These were major industries such as pulp and paper, organic 
chemicals, seafood, and fruit and vegetable processing.  As noted above, the standards 
were supposed to be technology-based.  Congress in fact specified several different kinds 
of standards:  First was best practicable technology (BPT), which all plants in affected 
industries were to adopt by mid-1977.  Congress did not define “practicable,” but the 
EPA appeared to rely on two rules of thumb:  Where applicable, BPT meant secondary or 
biological treatment, and otherwise it would represent the best standard of treatment 
currently found in the industry. More stringent were the best available technology 
economically achievable, or BAT, standards, which were to be installed by mid-1983.  
Still more stringent were the new source performance standards (NSPS), which were to 
be applied to new plants seeking permits after the standards were promulgated.  As 
mentioned above, for indirect dischargers there were also two sets of pretreatment 
standards, for new and existing sources.  For each set of standards, at least two pollutants 
were regulated, and usually four or more. 
For example, Table 1 shows the final BPT regulations for dairies, which are in 
several ways typical of all Effluent Guidelines.  There are many subcategories, and 
acceptable pollutant discharge rates vary significantly among them.  Besides BOD there 
are seven other BPT standards, but each is related to the BOD standard by a fixed 
numerical rule. The table shows four for BOD and four for TSS, each with a 30-day 
average and one-day maximum standard for large and small facilities In other words, the 
number of subcategories means that preparing the rules is very time-consuming and data-
hungry, but perhaps not quite as much so as eight sets of standards per subcategory would 
suggest. The table shows no BAT or NSPS rules, but such rules show similar patterns.   
                                                 
6 In addition, EPA concluded in 1974 that 18 more industries required Effluent Guidelines.  The total 
number of industries with guidelines today is about 65. 
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Table 1. 
BPT Regulations for the Dairy Point Source Category 
 
BOD 30-day standard, large facilities (kg per 1000 kg of BOD5 input) 
Receiving Stations  0.190 
Fluid Products  1.350 
Cultured Products  1.350 
Butter 0.550 
Cottage Cheese and Cultured Cream Cheese  2.680 
Natural and Processed Cheese  0.290 
Fluid Mix for Ice Cream and Other Frozen Desserts  0.880 
Ice Cream, Frozen Desserts, and Dairy Desserts  1.840 
Condensed Milk  1.380 
Dry Milk  0.650 
Condensed Whey  0.400 
Dry Whey  0.400 
Other limits 
To get the limits in each subcategory for the standards 
below, 
Multiply the number above 
by 
Large facility BOD one-day maximum discharge  2.5 
Large facility TSS 30-day average  1.5 
Large facility TSS one-day maximum discharge  3.75 
Small facility BOD 30-day average  1.67 
Small facility BOD one-day maximum discharge  3.33 
Small facility TSS 30-day average  2.5 
Small facility TSS one-day maximum discharge  5 
pH limitation, all plants  6.0 to 9.0 
Indirect Discharges from Industrial Plants 
Household wastes show little variation from one day to the next, at least in 
comparison to industrial wastewater, and POTW designs take advantage of this 
characteristic.  Much industrial waste is similar in important ways to domestic waste; for 
example, the food and paper industries have waste streams that are primarily organic.  
Thus many industrial wastes can potentially be treated in POTWs.  However, industrial Resources for the Future  Harrington 
wastewater can also cause serious problems for POTWs.  Toxic material or highly acidic 
or alkaline material can disrupt the microbial ecology of the waste treatment plant, 
reducing its efficiency.  Other wastes, toxic or otherwise, can pass through the plant 
unaffected and pose a direct public health risk or a threat to aquatic ecosystems.  Still 
other wastes, such as alcohol, might be treatable but pose a threat of fire or explosion 
within the sewer itself.  Finally, some industrial wastes could be too clean.  Cooling 
water, for example, would simply add to the flow of the plant, diluting the waste stream 
and making pollutant abatement more difficult and costly. 
The pretreatment guidelines (40 CFR Part 403) were designed to assist POTWs in 
dealing with the above problems.  They contain instructions for setting up a pretreatment 
program, plus specific prohibitions against industrial discharge of wastes that would harm 
the POTW or that would pass through it unscathed.  In addition, the guidelines 
established technology-based pretreatment standards for the quality of wastewater sent to 
a POTW from certain industrial categories.  For other industries, the standard for 
pretreatment were to be set at the local level.  In states where permit responsibility had 
been delegated, the state DEQs could further delegate responsibility for writing and 
enforcing permits to the local POTW.  Nearly all states have done so.   
In addition, the Effluent Guidelines for each industry contain pretreatment 
standards for new and existing plants discharging into sewers.  These standards were 
designed to prevent industrial discharges from interfering with plant operations and to 
limit pass-through of untreated pollutants to what a direct discharging plant would be 
allowed under the BAT standards. 
Headworks analysis  
To set the local limits for pollutant discharge by industries, the POTW conducts a 
“headworks analysis,” or an estimate, pollutant by pollutant, of the total waste loading 
that the plant can safely accept from non-household sectors.  An EPA guidance document 
(U.S. EPA 2001) provides detailed instructions on the preparation of the headworks 
analysis, and recommends that it be revisited every year.  The headworks analysis begins 
with an estimate of allowable waste discharge into the environment, either in the plant 
effluent or the sludges.  The allowable effluent discharge is generally taken from the 
NPDES permit.  The POTW may have more discretion on sludge composition.  If the 
plant wishes to produce sludge that is salable, for example, the permissible loading of 
toxic materials is much lower than it otherwise might be.  Given the permissible 
discharge of each pollutant, getting the permissible influent at the headworks requires 
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knowledge of the total removal efficiency of each pollutant by the plant.  Calculation of 
these removal efficiencies is thus central to the headworks analysis. 
Next, the POTW estimates waste discharges from waste haulers, such as septic 
tank cleaners, and other wastes that may be delivered by truck, and from “uncontrolled 
sources,” perhaps small commercial operations that are difficult to control.  These wastes 
are subtracted, pollutant-by-pollutant, in their entirety from the plant’s “maximum 
allowable headworks loading.”  From the remainder, the POTW further subtracts a safety 
margin to allow for contingencies and a growth allowance.  What is left is the waste load 
that can be allocated to nonhousehold users, or in EPA terminology, the maximum 
allowable industrial loading (MAIL).   
Now the POTW must allocate the allowable discharges for each pollutant to the 
industrial users.  Evidently, the most common allocation method is to set “uniform-
concentration local discharge limitations,” which, “have become synonymous in the 
Pretreatment Program with the term local limits,” according to the EPA Guidance (U.S. 
EPA 2001 p. 6-3).  In this method, the allowable discharges of each pollutant are 
allocated to users so that the limits, expressed in terms of pollutant concentration, are the 
same for each pollutant.   
Although this is apparently the most common method chosen, it is not required.  
EPA guidance and regulations do not, for example, rule out the use of marketable permits 
to allocate the MAIL, much as emission offsets and ultimately cap-and-trade programs 
grew out of aggregate emission limits in nonattainment areas of the Clean Air Act.  And 
yet, there has apparently been little if any use of tradable permits in this context anywhere 
in the country.  Apparently the only tradable permit program currently in use for the 
allocation of local limits in POTWs is found in Passaic, New Jersey.7 
Rulemaking Outcomes 
In this section and the next, we consider two classes of outcomes of the Effluent 
Guidelines process.  In this section we discuss what may be called the rulemaking 
outcomes, or the administrative outputs of the process.  In the next section, we turn to the 
“real” outcomes, the effectiveness of the effluent limitations on the ground and their 
actual cost.  
                                                 
7 For a description of this program, see Industrial Economics (1998). 
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Administrative effort 
One of the charges raised against the use of command-and-control (CAC) policy 
instruments is the supposed administrative effort required to implement the standards.  
This is a rather sweeping complaint, considering the great variety of CAC policies.  In the 
case of the Effluent Guidelines, however, it seems to be a valid concern. Especially in the 
writing of the direct discharge standards, the program imposed large costs, not only on 
the agency, but also on other interested parties, such as affected firms, trade associations, 
and environmental groups.  The costs were incurred when these affected parties made 
extensive comments on proposed regulations and, frequently, challenged final regulations 
in court. 
Obviously, establishing the Effluent Guidelines was an enormous task for the 
young agency.  Not only did it have to give operational meaning to words like “best,” 
“practicable,” and “economically achievable,” it also had to collect a vast amount of 
information about each industry to be regulated—including information about production 
techniques, location, waste products, and waste treatment technology.  Moreover, the 
agency started out with a very narrow information base on these matters.  In contrast to 
the older style of economic regulation practiced in the Federal Power Commission or the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, where regulators dealt with a single industry over a 
number of years, the EPA had to deal with the full range of manufacturing in the 
American economy. 
The information requirements were exacerbated by another factor.  Very early in 
the standard-setting process, the EPA became aware that the great heterogeneity in the 
products and processes of each of the 30 industries would preclude use of the same 
standards for all plants in that industry.  Each industry, therefore, had to be 
subcategorized into generally homogeneous subsets for purposes of water pollution 
regulation.  The number of subcategories was quite large (e.g., 20 in dairies, 9 in sugar, 
105 in fruits and vegetables). In all, EPA created over 360 industrial subcategories among 
the first 30 industries requiring Effluent Guidelines.  Each required separate BPT, BAT, 
NSPS, and pretreatment regulations.  
To collect and organize the mass of information required to set these standards, 
EPA hired a number of consulting firms.  Most of these firms had industry ties, which 
was an asset in winning the cooperation of the firms to be regulated, but it also raised 
concerns in some quarters about the contractors’ closeness to the industry.  The 
contractors had the task of preparing “development documents” containing information 
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on the structure of the industry, its production and waste treatment technologies, the 
estimated cost of pollution abatement, and suggested effluent standards. 
The development document with these suggested standards were taken under 
study by the EPA and often circulated among industry sources for comment.  Soon 
thereafter, the agency would issue the proposed standards.  As noted above, interested 
parties had the opportunity to submit additional information and make comments on the 
regulation during a comment period lasting several months.  EPA took these comments 
and, after some further time had elapsed, would issue final standards.  
In promulgating the Effluent Guidelines, the agency had to follow the procedures 
of informal or “notice-and-comment” rulemaking as specified in the Administrative 
Procedures Act (5 USC 553).  The APA requires the agency to give notice of proposed 
rulemaking, propose regulations, and allow a 60- to 90-day period for interested parties to 
make comment before promulgating final regulations.  The EPA received many 
comments on the proposed Effluent Guidelines, and was required to answer each 
comment in the Federal Register.   
Finally, the regulations were often challenged in court.  As of 1976, the National 
Commission on Water Quality (1976) reported that over 250 lawsuits had challenged 
specific guidelines.  Every set of guidelines faced litigation. 
Regulatory output 
Initial BPT standards 
Given the difficulties of promulgating the standards, it is not surprising that the 
promulgation of the Effluent Guidelines fell behind the schedule set by Congress.  
Indeed, not one of the original 30 sets of guidelines was issued within the statutory 
deadline of one year.  However, it is probably more appropriate to view this as a 
consequence of impossible deadlines set by Congress, rather than regulatory dawdling by 
the EPA.  It should be clear from the procedural and analytical requirements, not to 
mention the necessity of collecting and responding to public comments, that the EPA’s 
task was impossible within the statutory limitation and the resources available to it.   
By any other standard, the Effluent Guidelines process was remarkably 
productive in terms of regulations written.  Compared to other new rulemaking processes 
that were going on at approximately the same time, including health and safety regulation 
at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), hazardous substance 
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regulation under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), and regulation of consumer 
product safety at the Consumer Product Safety Commission, many more regulations were 
written for the Effluent Guidelines program than for any other program (Magat et al. 
1986). 
BAT standards 
Amendments to the Clean Water Act in 1977 modified the BAT standards to 
focus on toxic discharges and devised a new set of standards called best conventional 
technology” (BCT) to designate more advanced abatement of conventional pollutants 
than that provided by the BPT standards.  According to Adler et al. (1993), the EPA had 
difficulties writing new BAT toxics regulations or revising existing BAT regulations so 
as to reflect the new orientation on toxics.  In 1987, further amendments to the Clean 
Water Act directed the EPA to prepare a plan indicating how it would comply with the 
BAT requirements.  When the plan was unveiled in early 1988, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC) sued, leading to a consent decree in which EPA agreed to 
prepare over 20 new BAT regulations in the next 10 years.  As of 1992, the NRDC 
estimates that only one-third of all direct dischargers had permits based on the BAT 
standards.  The other two-thirds were in categories for which no standards were written 
and had permits based on the “best professional judgment” (BPJ) of the permit writer 
(Adler et al. 1993). 
Zero discharge 
As a step toward meeting the zero-discharge goal, the BAT standards were to 
“result in further progress toward the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all 
pollutants … [and] require the elimination of all discharges if … such elimination is 
technically and economically feasible” (Sec. 301(b)(2)(A)). Sec. 304(b)(3) requires the 
EPA to “identify control measures and practices available to eliminate the discharges of 
pollutants from classes and categories of point sources.”   
Inasmuch as complete elimination of all discharges would seem to be an 
impossible task, since 1972 there has been confusion and dispute over the meaning of the 
zero-discharge goal and how to make it operational.  Adler et al. (1993) argue that the 
point of zero discharge was what we now call pollution prevention:  the reduction, 
elimination, or capture of pollutants before they enter the wastewater stream.  They 
strongly criticize the EPA for failing to implement the portions of the Clean Water Act 
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relating to zero discharge.  BAT retains to this day an end-of-pipe focus, and the EPA has 
issued zero-discharge regulations in very few industrial categories. 
Regulatory stringency 
The moral premise underlying the Effluent Guidelines and other technology-
based standards was that polluters ought to do their “best” to reduce waste discharges.  
Operationally, what was best was to be based on the technological possibilities, as 
determined by disinterested experts at the EPA and elsewhere.  Seemingly, this language 
did not permit much bargaining between the agency and the regulated sources of 
pollution.  In fact, of course, standard setting was never so cut-and-dried.  For BPT 
standards in industries discharging organic waste, for example, EPA’s contractors first set 
the standard in each industry at what was considered secondary treatment, or about 20 
mg/l for BOD and TSS.  These concentrations were converted into quantity discharge 
standards, generally expressed in pounds of pollutant per thousand pounds of output, 
using data supplied by the industry or otherwise obtained by the contractors on water use 
and production.   
The standards in the development document underwent substantial and systematic 
change before being released as final standards.  Among the first 30 industries, the BPT 
standards for BOD and TSS increased on average by 44% and 92%, respectively.  (Of 
course, there is another way of looking at the change.  If a standard initially called for 
90% reduction of a pollutant, a 92% increase in the standard would still result in an 81% 
reduction.).  Only for a small number of subcategories were the final standards tighter 
than the contractor or proposed standards.   
These results might seem to suggest that the affected industries were able to 
intervene to influence the content of the regulations in a way favorable to their interests.  
However, a statistical analysis of the BPT rulemaking experience by Magat et al. (1986) 
found otherwise.  Magat et al. examined the effect on the BPT regulations of a number of 
“external signals,” including the number of comments received from industrial sources on 
the regulation, the political and economic power of the industry affected, and warnings or 
projections of unemployment or plant closures, and found none that were statistically 
significant.   
Instead, they found that a number of internal variables, including document 
quality and staff turnover, were much more important in explaining outcomes.  The 
researchers made their own ex ante assessments of the quality of the development 
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documents and economic analyses, based primarily on whether information presented 
was internally consistent and whether calculations could be replicated.  They found that 
when the development document failed their quality test, the resulting BPT standards 
were 33% weaker for BOD and 44% weaker for TSS than they would have been had the 
document been stronger. Turnover during the process was associated with a weakening of 
the standards of 33% (BOD) and 68% (TSS).   
Abatement Costs  
One of the most important barriers to analysis of regulatory instruments is the 
great difficulty of getting good estimates of the cost of compliance, especially ex post.  
Ex ante estimates are a little easier to come by because, since the 1970s, federal 
rulemakers have been required either by agency policy or by presidential executive order 
to prepare estimates of the cost of compliance.  From the very first rules promulgated in 
the Effluent Guidelines program, the agency estimated costs of compliance.   
Incremental costs and economic impact 
At the time the regulations were prepared, the focus was not on cost-effectiveness, 
but on the aggregate effects of regulations on the rate of inflation and the level of 
economic activity.  Nonetheless, the development documents prepared to support the 
individual regulations did contain fairly detailed data on abatement costs of “model 
plants” of various output capacities and levels of abatement.  From these development 
documents, researchers at RFF were able to construct rudimentary incremental abatement 
cost functions that would yield estimates of the cost of compliance with the regulations.  
These cost functions show that against a goal of minimizing total discharges of BOD and 
TSS, the Effluent Guidelines were far from cost-effective.   
For example, among various subcategories of the poultry industry, ex ante 
incremental costs of BOD removal varied between $0.10 and $3.15 per pound. As shown 
in Table 2, the costs varied by plant size and type of bird processed, with chicken and 
fowl processing plants having particularly low marginal abatement costs.   
13 Resources for the Future  Harrington 
14 
Of course, the Effluent Guidelines were not intended to be cost-effective, but to 
define a praticable standard that plants in the industry could attain.  Cost-effectiveness 
was not even a consideration in the economic analysis that was performed as part of the 
regulatory package.  Instead, the regulators were concerned about the impact of the 
standards on plant closures and unemployment.  An economic analysis was prepared for 
each regulation by combining abatement cost estimates with output demand elasticities 
taken from the economics literature to get the effect of the regulation on firm and 
industry profit.  Employment and plant-closure effects were in turn based on the 
estimated loss of profits. 
Comparison of Ex ante and Ex post Cost Estimates 
In 1979, in response to a directive from Congress, the EPA published The Cost of 
Clean Air and Water, a report giving estimates of the expected cost to governments at all 
levels and to all industries of complying with the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.  
According to this report, in the decade between 1977 and 1986, the nation’s 
manufacturers would spend $3.8 billion per year in capital costs and $15.9 billion per 
year in operating costs (in 2002 dollars).   
Table 3 compares this estimate with the actual costs for the years 1982 through 
1994, as reported in the annual Pollution Abatement Capital Expenditure (PACE) Survey.  
As noted in The Cost of Clean, delays in the issuance of rules and still greater delays 
Table 2 
Ex ante Incremental Costs of BOD Removal 
($/kg) 
Chicken – large plants  0.10 
Chicken –medium plants  0.16 
Chicken –small plants  0.25 
Duck – Large plants  1.04 
Duck – Small plants  3.15 
Fowl – large plants  0.10 
Fowl – small plants  0.20 
Further processing  0.35 
Turkey 0.60 
Source:  Magat et al. (1986) Resources for the Future  Harrington 
caused by legal challenges to them threw the timetable off by several years.  As these 
delays were much more of an issue in some categories than in others, there is no exact 
comparison as to time period, and looking at the period 1982–1994 is probably no worse 
than looking at 1977–1986.  Also, the PACE survey did not begin until 1982.  As shown 
in Table 3, the capital costs rose sharply beginning in 1988, doubling by 1991, and then 
receding slightly.  Examination of more detailed data shows that most of the increase is in 
a few industrial categories, notably organic chemicals and petroleum and coal products.  
Apparently this reflects the promulgation of the costly and important BAT rules in these 
industries. 
In the aggregate, reported abatement costs in every year from 1982 to 1994 fell 
far short of the abatement costs estimated ex ante in 1979 (Table 3).  On average, capital 
costs were overestimated by 72% and operating and maintenance (O&M) costs by 117%.  
The pattern of overestimation holds in all industrial categories; as shown in Table 4, there 
was only one category where costs were underestimated (stone, clay, and glass).  Table 4 
also illustrates how the costs of abatement are concentrated in a few key industries.  
Chemicals alone accounts for 31% of all abatement investment and 27% of operating 
costs.  
This comparison is consistent with earlier findings by Harrington, Morgenstern, 
and Nelson (2000), which compared ex post and ex ante cost estimates for about 25 
environmental and occupational health programs.  Abatement costs tend to be 
overestimated for several reasons.  Three are probably of special importance for effluent 
guidelines.  First, the cost estimates do not—cannot—take account of technological 
innovation.  Regulators were supposed to find an off-the-shelf technology that would 
achieve the specified abatement, and the cost estimate referred to this technology.  
Second, the baseline level of industrial pollution control was probably better than the 
EPA expected at the time (1973–78) the cost estimates for the first group of industries 
were prepared.  As a result, the typical industrial plant had to do less than the EPA 
expected to come into compliance with the guidelines.  Finally, as noted above, the 
regulations were relaxed considerably between the contractor’s report and the final 
promulgated standards.  Most likely, the cost estimate was not revised to reflect the 
promulgated standard, but reflects at best the agency’s proposed standard.  As discussed 
further below, the standards were relaxed considerably over the course of the rulemaking 
process. 
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Patterns of abatement investment 
As noted above, one stated purpose of the zero-discharge requirement of the 
Clean Water Act was to encourage alternatives to end-of-pipe treatment.  Although 
regulations were never promulgated to promote source reduction, the existing BAT 
regulations as well as the pretreatment requirements for indirect sources provide some 
incentive for source reduction.  Even though technology-based standards for pollution 
abatement typically designate a particular end-of-pipe technology, permitees are 
generally allowed to use whatever technology is capable of meeting the requirements.  
With this in mind, let us consider what the PACE data reveal about the choice of 
abatement technique.  At least between 1986 and 1994, the PACE questionnaire allowed 
respondents to disaggregate expenditures into “end of pipe” and “process change” 
categories.  In Figure 1, we show the share of abatement investment designated as 
“process change” by sector for the years 1986 and 1994.  As shown, process change for 
all industry increased from 18% to 30% of all investment in this interval.  Only two 
industries showed declines:  furniture and nonelectrical machinery.  Several categories, 
including printing/publishing, fabricated metal products, and chemicals, could show very 
large gains in the importance of process-change investment.  Over this period, total 
investment in abatement nearly doubled, so the absolute increase in process change 
investment was greater than these figures suggest.   
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Table 3 
Estimated Ex post Abatement Costs, All 
Manufacturing 
(millions of 2002 dollars) 
Year Capital O&M 
1982  1629 5817
1983  1314 6326
1984  1373 6644
1985  1526 6911
1986  1524 7070
1987  NA NA 
1988  1775 7267
1989  2420 7765
1990  3385 8192
1991  3469 7818
1992  3019 7911
1993  2696 7790
1994  2795 8092
Mean 82-94 2244 7300
Ex ante  3870 15893 
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Table 4  
Water Pollution Abatement Expenditures: 
Comparison of Ex ante and Ex post Estimates 
(millions of 2002 dollars) 
  1979 Estimate







      
All  industries  3870.6 15893.2 1528.4  7083.7 
Food and kindred products  175.0  2349.9  159.0  823.0 
Textiles 346.9  1107.3  15.4  139.5 
Lumber  24.4 135.1 16.0  62.6 
Furniture  1.2 3.1 1.0  26.9 
Pulp and Paper  371.6  1594.5  142.4  831.3 
Printing/publishing NC  NC  6.3  37.9 
Chemicals  1284.4  2999.5 478.3 1913.7 
Petroleum and coal products  361.7  2738.7  178.6  849.4 
Rubber and misc. plastics  101.9  265.3  14.1  76.4 
Leather  33.2  72.6 1.6 24.8 
Stone, clay, and glass  13.0  101.6  20.1  100.4 
Primary  metal  490.6 2541.8 109.8  748.6 
aUSEPA, 1979. 
bU.S. Bureau of the Census, 1989.   
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Process change investment by industry, 1986 and 1994
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Real Outcomes 
We consider two outcomes of the industrial water pollution permitting process.  
First, we consider the extent to which the new permits resulted in actual reductions in the 
amounts of pollutants entering water bodies.  Second, we consider the evidence related to 
changes in water quality.   
Have pollutant discharges from point sources been reduced? 
According to an EPA estimate made in the early 1990s, full compliance with 
BAT-based permits and secondary treatment for POTWs would lead to a 97% reduction 
in the direct discharge of priority pollutants generated by POTWs and industrial point 
sources into the nation’s waters (Adler et al. 1993, p. 139, citing internal EPA 
documents).  That assumes not only that discharge permits reflect BAT, but that the 
sources comply with them.   
It appears that by the mid-1980s direct dischargers had achieved and thereafter 
sustained a high rate of compliance with permit conditions.  EPA estimated in 1984 that 
only 6% of major direct dischargers were in “significant noncompliance” with their 
permit requirements.  Over the next decade, the rate remained at this level, except for a 
brief excursion to about 14% in 1990 (U.S. EPA 1987, 1995). Thus, by the mid-1980s, 
direct dischargers had achieved a high rate of compliance with their NPDES permits.  As 
noted above, however, most direct dischargers had permits that were not based on BAT, 
but on BPJ.  These permits tended to impose less stringent requirements than the BAT 
standards.   
It appears, therefore, that direct dischargers may have achieved significant 
effluent reductions by 1994, but they had not achieved the reductions anticipated in the 
BAT standards.  
Among POTWs, the large-scale investment in wastewater treatment increased the 
fraction of the U.S. served by wastewater treatment plants from 42% in 1970 to 74% by 
1985. Among all POTWs, the rate of significant noncompliance with permits was 11% in 
1984 and had declined to about 9% in 1994.  However, an EPA-sponsored audit of 
POTW pretreatment programs in 1992 found that 54% of significant industrial users 
(SIUs) were in “significant noncompliance,” which means they failed to observe at least 
one component of the POTW’s pretreatment program.  Of these, 35% were in violation of 
discharge standards and 36% were in violation of self-monitoring or reporting 
requirements (Adler et al. 1993). 
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At least until the mid-1990s, in other words, the pollutant reductions achieved by 
the effluent guidelines program were significantly less than what had been achieved by 
full implementation.  This failure probably accounts for at least part of the gap between 
ex ante and ex post estimates of compliance costs. 
Has water quality improved? 
It is generally agreed that the Clean Water Act has achieved some important local 
successes in improving water quality.  In rivers near major cities, contact recreation is 
now encouraged in areas where it had been forbidden in the 1970s, an outcome probably 
attributable to the regulation of pollutants from point sources. Knopman and Smith 
(1993) cite improvements in the Potomac near Washington, the Delaware near 
Philadelphia, and the Flint River in Georgia.  State water quality control administrators’ 
assessments of their own state’s progress during the first decade of the Clean Water Act 
indicated that most believe there has been significant improvement (Association of State 
and Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators 1984). A report by the National 
Research Council (1993) acknowledged these improvements but warned that there were 
still many problems. 
Even today, a systematic assessment of the effects of the Clean Water Act on 
water quality is very difficult and uncertain because of a lack of suitable data and no 
consensus on the most meaningful ways to aggregate trend data across water bodies and 
pollutants. The best evidence, from the 424 stations in the National Stream Quality 
Assessment Network (NASQAN),8 is mixed.  For example, consider dissolved oxygen, 
the water quality criterion that might be expected to show the most improvement (i.e., 
increases in DO) as a result of pollution abatement from point sources.  During the 1980s 
there was no significant change in average DO concentrations across all monitoring sites.  
Taken individually, 38 stations showed increasing DO, 26 showed decreasing DO, and 
for the rest there was no significant change.  Among the 26 stations near urban areas, 
                                                 
8 Although there are thousands of water quality monitoring sites in rivers, streams, and estuaries across the 
country, the data are not suitable for discerning long-term trends in water quality; there are relatively few 
stations where data have been collected over a long period of time by the same methods and for the same 
pollutants.  As of 1993, the only two exceptions are two networks operated by the U.S. Geological Survey 
(USGS):  NASQAN, 420 stations located on major rivers; and the Hydrologic Basin Network, 55 stations 
located on headwaters in pristine areas, designed to provide water quality baselines. Two long-term 
environmental monitoring projects were initiated in the early 1990s.  In 1991, the USGS began the National 
Water Quality Assessment (NAWQA), a long-term effort at water quality assessment that is just now 
beginning to yield results.  The EPA launched the Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Program 
(EMAP), designed to monitor trends in ecological resources generally. 
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however, there was apparent improvement, as the percentage reporting large DO deficits 
(average concentrations less than 6.5 mg/l) decreased from 40% of all stations to 20%.  
Note the small sample size, however (Smith et al. 1991). 
Smith et al. (1991) also examined loadings of several pollutants delivered to 
streams.  For nitrate, the data show no change in loads except in two of the nation’s 14 
water-resource regions, where concentrations declined by 0.4% per year (lower 
Mississippi) and 1.6% per year (upper Mississippi).  Phosphorus concentrations declined 
in all but one region, and in three midwestern regions by over 3% per year.  The authors 
attributed the improvement to reductions in point-source discharges and more widespread 
use of low-phosphorus detergents.  Finally, suspended solids declined in 11 regions (by at 
most 1.3% per year) and increased modestly in three regions.   
These results suggest that the Clean Water Act, and in particular its point-source 
programs, has made at least modest improvements in water quality, especially 
considering the increase in economic activity during the 1980s.  Incomplete 
implementation of the Clean Water Act during the 1980s was one reason improvements 
were not larger, but probably a far more important factor was the failure of the Act to do 
much about nonpoint sources.  
Long-Run Responses of Point Sources to the Clean Water Act 
In the long run, it is expected that economic incentive (EI) and command-and-
control (CAC) approaches to pollution abatement will lead to different results on the 
ground.  Two hypotheses in particular address these differences.  First, we hypothesize 
that EI approaches will exhibit greater dynamic efficiency—that is, they will encourage 
more innovation in waste treatment than CAC instruments, since they exert more 
pressure on firms to reduce pollutant discharges.  
In addition, we expect EI approaches to be more adaptable to changes in 
conditions.  Suppose, for example, economic growth in a region means that existing 
pollution-reduction policies cannot achieve acceptable air or water quality.  If emission 
permits are marketable and fixed in supply, the reallocation of waste discharges is taken 
care of automatically, without intervention by the authorities.9  To accommodate growth 
in a CAC system, however, the entire regulatory process needs to be reopened, with new 
                                                 
9 It should be pointed out that an effluent fee system is not quite so automatic, since it requires the 
authorities to raise the tax rates. 
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regulations established for at least some sources.  In fact, one of the ways that CAC 
systems have accommodated change in the past has been to convert, at least in part, to 
economic incentive systems.  Indeed, this is how tradable permits were first introduced 
into stationary source air pollution policy in the late 1970s (Krupnick and Harrington 
1980).  Below we will discuss evidence for and against the proposition that economic 
incentives are likewise being gradually introduced into the point-source water pollution 
program.  
Thirty years (1972–2002) is certainly enough time to observe the effects of the 
Clean Water Act on patterns of point-source water pollution, the overall structure of 
water pollution abatement, and how these changes in turn have affected the nature of 
regulation.  And, as we describe below, there have been some interesting and important 
developments that make the policy landscape much different from what it was 30 years 
ago.  Unfortunately, these changes are very difficult to document systematically, because 
the relevant data, when collected at all, are scattered in EPA regional offices, state DEQs, 
and POTWs.  What follows is mostly a journalistic account, based on conversations the 
author had with officials in the EPA’s Office of Water, regulatory authorities in the water 
program offices of state DEQs, pretreatment coordinators at POTWs, and engineers at 
regulated firms and their consultants. 
The Legacy of the POTW Construction Grants Program 
Although the Construction Grants Program is not the direct focus of this paper, it 
appears to have had a powerful effect on industrial wastewater discharges.  As noted 
above, federal construction grants would provide 75% of the capital cost of abatement 
technology, or more if the states chipped in.  At the time, economists and others pointed 
out that these subsidies create perverse incentives for POTWs (e.g., Freeman 1978).  In 
the first place, a capital-only subsidy distorts the mix of capital and other inputs and 
encourages the installation of waste treatment that is excessively capital-intensive.  
Freeman also argued that the subsidy would encourage the building of excess capacity.  
Perhaps there would be no such incentive if POTWs could be certain that the subsidy 
would always be available, but such a guarantee would be impossible to give, and, in any 
case, it was known that only a fixed amount of money was appropriated for the purpose.  
In addition, communities could have viewed the excess sewer capacity as a way of 
attracting industry. 
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A study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 1985) in references found that 
extensive excess capacity was installed, and specific examples emerged in conversations 
with POTWs and others.  For example, the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission 
(which serves Montgomery County and Prince George’s County near Washington, D.C.) 
was able to obtain construction grants for plants that would double its capacity.10  
Twenty-five years later, WSSC still has excess capacity that dates to this period.  WSSC 
does not even monitor for conventional pollutants because it can treat anything its 
industrial sources send to their plants.  (It does monitor for pH and toxics, however, since 
those pollutants can interfere with plant operations.) 
The excess capacity in POTWs became an attractive alternative to pollution 
abatement for many direct dischargers facing major expenses in complying with permit 
requirements based on the new Effluent Guidelines, particularly in plants processing 
organic wastes that could easily be handled by POTWs.  A case involving Smithfield 
Foods provides an example.11  In the late 1980s, the state of Virginia promulgated new 
effluent regulations limiting phosphorus discharges from point sources into the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed to 2.0 mg/l.  Two plants operated by Smithfield Foods in Isle 
of Wight County found it extremely difficult to meet this requirement and challenged the 
regulation.  As the suit went through the courts, the plants continued to discharge 
wastewater with excessive phosphorus concentrations, and the state brought an 
enforcement action.  The case was eventually resolved in part by an agreement by the 
firm to pipe the wastewater from these two plants 20 miles to an underutilized POTW 
operated by the Hampton Roads Sanitary District.   
According to EPA regulations (40 CFR Sec. 35.2125), construction grant monies 
could not be used to treat industrial wastes.  But once the plant was built, there was 
nothing to prevent the plant from accepting waste from industrial sources, especially if 
the industrial user paid a share of the costs.  In fact, given that the excess POTW capacity 
exists, using it to treat industrial waste is efficient as long as there are no pass-through or 
interference issues, because otherwise the POTW would be underutilized.  Of course, that 
is not to say that it is efficient ex ante to overbuild POTWs with the expectation of using 
the excess capacity to treat industrial waste. 
                                                 
10 Personal communication, Steve Laszlo, Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, September 10, 
2002.  
11 The facts of the case are summarized in United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 772–
781 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
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Trends in Direct and Indirect Discharge 
Many industrial dischargers, though obviously not all, have a choice of whether to 
seek an NPDES permit and discharge directly to receiving waters or to send wastewater 
to a POTW.  Evidence suggests that, over the past 25 years, there has been a gradual shift 
away from direct discharge by major industrial dischargers and toward indirect discharge.  
Certainly in industries treating primarily organic waste, this trend is unmistakable, but it 
may extend to other industries as well. In Maryland, for example, the number of major 
direct dischargers has slowly declined from about 50 to 35 in the past two decades.12  
According to Maryland state officials, the decline is not the result of plants switching 
over to indirect discharge.  Rather, it is due to the gradual retirement of the existing direct 
discharging plants, together with the tendency of new plants to opt for indirect discharge 
whenever possible. Elsewhere, however, industrial plants facing difficulties meeting 
direct discharge standards have made the switch, the Smithfield plants discussed above 
being a prominent example.   
At least in terms of numbers of plants, indirect dischargers now greatly 
outnumber direct dischargers.  In 1995, the EPA reported that there were about 7,000 
major dischargers holding NPDES permits and discharging directly into receiving waters.  
Of these, over half were POTWs.  At the same time, there were over 35,000 “significant 
industrial users” discharging into POTWs (USEPA 1995). 
In interviews, industry representatives, consultants, state officials, and 
pretreatment coordinators all agreed that most plants would vastly prefer to send wastes 
to a POTW.  The reasons are not hard to find.  One plant owned by a major manufacturer 
of dairy products and without access to a POTW incurred incremental costs of $3.16 per 
pound of BOD or TSS to meet BAT requirements.  As discussed further in the next 
section, this is an order of magnitude greater than the unit fees imposed by POTWs. 
Moreover, the excess capacity induced by the Construction Grants Program probably has 
made POTW operators eager to take industrial waste since they could charge very low 
fees and still more than cover short-run marginal costs. 
Industrial dischargers have other, less tangible reasons for avoiding direct 
discharge.  Because the discharge goes directly into the receiving waters, permit 
requirements for direct dischargers are much more stringent and more closely scrutinized 
than those for indirect dischargers.  They are also more visible, because environmental 
                                                 
12 Personal communication, Ed Stone, Maryland Department of Environment, September 30, 2002. 
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watchdog groups pay much closer attention when there is no POTW to mediate the 
discharge.  Direct dischargers are also more concerned about liability, although recent 
federal regulations making violations of indirect discharge permits a violation of federal 
law may prompt more concern about indirect discharges. 
The apparent shift from direct to indirect discharge carries with it several 
interesting ramifications for point-source water pollution policy.  First, it moves 
pollutants into regimes in which effluent discharge regulations were less vigorously 
enforced, at least until the mid-1990s.  As noted above, from 1984 to 1994 the rate of 
noncompliance with permit requirements was 50% greater for POTWs than for industrial 
direct dischargers, and the noncompliance rate with pretreatment permit requirements 
exceeded 50%.  Second, it moves wastes out of closed systems, where all wastes that are 
generated are treated, and into combined sanitary and storm sewer systems.  A number of 
cities, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest, still have combined systems, where 
untreated wastes can bypass POTWs and flow directly into water bodies.  Third, it raises 
the possibility that more wastes will move into a regime in which a system of effluent 
charges may be emerging.  This third possibility is discussed further below. 
The Spread of Waste-Based Sewer Surcharges 
Fees charged by POTWs for accepting industrial wastes can be fixed, based on 
the flow rate, based on the waste load, or some combination of the above.  Some POTWs, 
though not many, have based fees on waste load since the 1960s, that is, before 
significant federal involvement in water quality.  Over time, more and more POTWs have 
resorted to the use of waste-based fees, and they have gradually increased the range of 
pollutants on which a fee is collected.  Today, a majority of POTWs charge for oxygen-
demanding materials (usually BOD, by pound or kg of oxygen demanded) and TSS, and 
increasingly they charge for a variety of other pollutants, including nitrogen, phosphorus, 
and fats, oils, and grease (FOG).   
These waste surcharges are said to have increased rapidly during the 1970s, but, 
since the early 1980s, they have stabilized or even declined somewhat.  Their nominal 
basis is, or at least was, the average cost of abatement at the POTW.  An EPA estimate 
prepared in 1986 of the cost of waste treatment at POTWs is 18¢/lb. BOD at a 25 million-
gallon-per-day (MGD) plant and 35¢/lb. at 0.38 MGD and 3.3 MGD plants.13   
                                                 
13 51 Fed. Reg. 24986 (1986). 
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A sample of fees charged industrial users for BOD and TSS discharges is shown 
in Table 5.  For space reasons we have left out fees on other pollutants, such as the fee on 
Kjeldahl nitrogen charged by some POTWs.  The third column in Table 5 is for 
“effective BOD” applicable to dairy waste, based on a rule of thumb given to the author 
by Dr. Roy Carawan of North Carolina State University, which is that TSS concentration 
in untreated dairy plant effluents, not including cheese plants, is usually the greater of 
500–600 mg/l or one-quarter of the BOD concentration.  This effective fee is a crude 
representation of the waste surcharge that would be facing dairy plants expressed in terms 
of BOD concentration.   
Are Waste-Based Surcharges Effluent Fees? 
In form, at least, these waste-based surcharges look very much like effluent fees.  
Whether they perform like effluent fees depends on three questions.  Are they large 
enough to have incentive effects?  If so, do plant managers respond to these incentives, 
either installing pretreatment or some method of source reduction of waste loads?  
Finally, do regulators at the POTWs, their state overseers, and the EPA use the fees to 
limit waste loads?  This last characteristic is assumed by the “textbook” discussions of 
economic instruments and their use.  However, casual observation of the cases cited as 
examples of emission fees suggests that few fee systems have this property. Rates are set 
not with some target aggregate emission rate in mind, but to meet other objectives, such 
as raising revenue.  Of course, the fact that these instruments are not “pure” does not 
mean they are not interesting or useful. 
The slender evidence available to the author on the incentive properties of the 
waste-based surcharges comes from scattered sources.  First, a paper presented at a 
conference on food processing wastes about 15 years ago suggests that at least at some 
plants, the cost of pretreatment is less than the waste-based fees charged by many 
POTWs.  Table 6 shows data on five dairy processing plants from Missouri, including the 
incremental costs of waste treatment, expressed in terms of BOD removal.  As shown, the 
incremental costs at the three plants with pretreatment vary from 12¢ to 24¢ per pound of 
BOD.  Comparing these results to the waste surcharges shown in Table 5, we see that the 
BOD waste surcharges exceed the highest incremental pretreatment costs at seven plants, 
and the effective BOD for dairy wastes exceeds the highest incremental costs at 21 
plants.  It should be noted, however, that these results may not be typical.  These three 
plants were in a uniquely favorable position regarding the disposal of sludges.  
Discussions with other dairy plant operators suggest that pretreatment of dairy wastes is 
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rarely cost-effective when compared to sending the untreated waste to the POTW and 
paying the fees.   
What is cost-effective, however, is source reduction.  Dairy operators report that 
the presence of waste surcharges has caused them to take a closer look at plant 
operations, and, as a result, they have found numerous opportunities for reducing waste 
loads by making changes to product specification, production process, product 
sequencing in a multiproduct operation, and production run lengths.  For example, longer 
production runs mean less cleaning of equipment, and therefore less wastewater. 
Nonetheless, there is some reason to question whether [or doubt that] plant 
managers are fully alive to the possibilities of reducing waste surcharges by examining 
waste loads in the plant.  One pretreatment coordinator recounted a story about a dairy 
that was paying millions of dollars per year in waste surcharges, apparently without 
anyone at the plant being aware of it.  It seems that the plant was a unit of a large 
multistate, multiplant operation, and the bills were being paid by the headquarters office, 
which had little idea of what kinds of waste reduction economies were available at the 
plant.  When this pretreatment coordinator brought the magnitude of these fees to the 
attention of his technical contact at the dairy, that individual was able to contact the home 
office and implement a study of local waste-load reduction possibilities.14  
This anecdotal evidence is therefore mixed with respect to the proposition that 
waste surcharges do have an incentive effect.  In principle, it would be easy enough to 
test the proposition statistically, but assembling an appropriate dataset is not easy.  
As to the third question, almost certainly regulators do not treat the surcharges as 
effluent fees, and it is not obvious how they could, given the current U.S. regulatory 
approach.  Consider how a POTW operator might react to the increase in waste load 
brought on by local economic and population growth that threatens to cause an increase 
in waste discharges from the POTW.  (This is analogous to the challenge that led to the 
introduction of pollution offsets in air quality management.)  The POTW has a permit 
that specifies a limit on its waste discharge.  Some portion of the available waste load has 
been allocated to industrial dischargers by a headworks analysis, as discussed in a 
preceding section.  The increase in the waste load could imply a reduction in the waste 
load available to the industrial dischargers.   
                                                 
14 Personal communication, Lyle Milby, pretreatment coordinator, Norman, Oklahoma, September 24, 
2002. 
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In an effluent fee regime, the way to respond to such increased waste loads is to 
increase the fees.  The POTW can take this action, and the increase in fees will 
presumably induce waste reduction among industrial dischargers.  However, the POTW 
cannot be certain that the waste reduction will be large enough or occur quickly enough 
to prevent the overall POTW discharge limits from being exceeded.  Without this 
certainty, it is unlikely that the POTW will take the approach of simply raising the fee, 
nor is it likely that the regulatory authorities at the state DEQ or at the EPA will allow the 
use of fees only to control effluent, without setting new quantity limits based on a new 
headworks analysis.  In other words, there appears to be an incompatibility between the 
use of fees upstream from the POTW and a nontransferable quantity instrument 
downstream.  
Conclusion 
Let us close with a discussion of the experience with the Effluent Guidelines in 
the context of hypotheses on the performance and characteristics of economic incentive 
instruments and command-and-control instruments.   
When Congress was deliberating over the shape of federal water pollution 
legislation around 1970, there was a brief period when it appeared as though the use of 
economic incentives—namely, a set of effluent fees—to control industrial and domestic 
discharges might get a hearing.  Ultimately, however, effluent fees were opposed by 
pollutant dischargers on the grounds that they were taxes and by environmental advocates 
who had no faith in the incentive properties of economic instruments.  They were a 
“license to pollute,” and polluters would simply pay the fees and continue to pollute 
(Kelman 1982).  The use of the police power was thought to be the only way of getting 
reliable results in a timely fashion.   
By these lights, the performance of the Effluent Guidelines was surely 
disappointing.  The NRDC’s performance audit of the Clean Water Act after 20 years 
(Adler et al. 1993) found serious delays both in the promulgation of the required BAT 
standards and in getting permits based on those standards, all of which required further 
legislation in 1987 to establish a new timetable for preparation of BAT standards.  To put 
this in perspective, however, we should note that the Clean Water Act was among the 
first environmental statutes to impose significant and costly responsibilities on U.S. 
industry.  Sources of pollution had to be convinced that environmental quality was a 
problem in the United States, that they were part of the problem, and that the federal 
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government had both the power to change their behavior and the willingness to use that 
power.  To an extent probably unappreciated in 1972, the rulemaking procedures and the 
courts provide many opportunities for regulated parties to contest the regulations, 
resulting in delay and weaker standards.  Still, the fact remained that the technology-
based regulatory approach, adopted primarily because of its presumed effectiveness, was 
probably not as effective as its proponents had expected ex ante.   
Today the Effluent Guidelines program appears to be changing in ways that no 
one anticipated in 1972.  At that time, the focus of the program was on the BPT, BAT, 
and NSPS standards for direct dischargers.  Over time, direct dischargers, while still 
important in some industries, have gradually become fewer in number and less important 
in environmental terms.  Among indirect dischargers, furthermore, it is likely that waste 
surcharges increasingly are having incentive effects as they are raised by local POTWs 
for revenue purposes.  That is, this quintessential regulatory program is gradually 
evolving into an economic incentive program.   
Waste-based surcharges are in fact only one of at least three ways of introducing 
economic incentives into industrial water pollution control.  The other two, which are 
beyond the scope of this paper, are the use of marketable permits to allocate the 
maximum allowable industrial load at POTWs, a program now in use at only one POTW, 
and the potential use of marketable permits to allocate total maximum daily loads 
(TMDLs) for direct dischargers into water-quality-limited water bodies.   
As has been frequently observed, many, if not most, economic incentive programs 
in actual use around the world have evolved out of purely regulatory instruments.  
Perhaps it is time to look at this common observation from the other end.  As time passes 
and new challenges emerge, CAC programs appear to have a strong tendency to adapt by 
incorporating economic incentives into their structure.   
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Table 5 




( $ / lb ) 
TSS
a  
( $ / lb ) 
Effective BOD 




Providence, RI  0.600  0.600  0.75 
Loudon, TN  0.460  0.460  0.575 
Delta, CO  0.340  0.340  0.425 
Salem, OR  0.301  0.222  0.357 
Nashville, TN  0.293  0.140  0.328 
Longmont, CO  0.270  0.230  0.325 
Boulder, CO  0.260  0.285  0.33 
Henderson, NV  0.230  0.220  0.285 
Lakeland, FL  0.186  0.116  0.215 
Mitchell, SD  0.180  0.160  0.22 
Savannah, GA  0.160  0.160  0.20 
Springfield, MO  0.151  0.086  0.172 
Aberdeen, SD  0.150  0.012  0.18 
Terre Haute, IN  0.150  0.150  0.187 
Wilmington, NC  0.140   0.100   0.165 
Gwinnett County Public Utilities, GA  0.120  0.120  0.15 
Wilson, NC  0.109  0.152  0.147 
Norman, OK  0.083  0.111  0.110 
Princeton, NJ  0.060  0.076  0.079 
North Davies Sewer District, UT  0.056  0.043  0.067 
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Sources:  Pretreatment Coordinators listserv at yahoo.com, Mannapperuma et al. 1993, various 
web pages. 
Notes. 
These charges apply only to wastes at concentrations in excess of a locally determined 
threshold, usually 200-300 mg/l.  For example, if waste strength is 1000 mg/l and the threshold 
is 300 mg/l, the fee is charged for only 7/10 of the waste load. 
bTo calculate “effective BOD” for dairy waste, add 25% of the fee for TSS to the BOD fee.  A 
rule of thumb for the concentration of TSS in dairy waste (except for cheese plants) is 25% of 
the BOD concentration. (Personal communication, Roy Carawan, North Carolina State 
University, November 4, 2002). 
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Table 6 
Cost of Waste Disposal at Five Dairy Plants 
Onsite wastewater treatment  Plant No.  Flow 
(million 
gallons 



















Plants with pretreatment 
2 157.4  973,000  176,000  193,000  0.242 649 
3 116.3  2,514,000  76,000  526,000  0.216 377 
181 74.0  1,285,000  193,000  134,000  0.123 1516 
Plants without pretreatment 
1 153.8  1,023,999  --  --  --  3868 
5 74.3  649,000  --  --  -- 5072 
Source:  Bough et al. 1988 plus author’s calculations. 
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